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Abstract
We estimate “CEO style” wage equations using two longitudinal matched employer-
employee data sets. We develop a model in which the wages of all employees in
a …rm are linked to those of top management, which generates speci…c empirical
implications that have already been tested on CEOs. We provide evidence that the
wages of “regular” employees in large …rms are linked to accounting and stock-market
pro…tability. Di¤erences in the strengths of these links across …rms provide support
for our model.
1 Introduction
The recent introduction of longitudinal matched employer-employee data sets has
proved quite valuable to labor economics by allowing integrated analyses of labor
demand and supply. In particular, these data sets allow researchers to control for,
and explore the consequences of, unobservable heterogeneity at both the …rm and
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1employee level. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) survey this literature, which has grown
impressively large since its beginnings a decade or so ago.
Much of the literature to date has focussed on characteristics that remain …xed
over time. Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Abowd, Finer, and Kramarz
(1999), and Finer (1997) are good examples of this, estimating models in which an
employee’s wage is a function of her endowment of human capital, an unobservable
person e¤ect that remains constant over time and across …rms, and an unobservable
…rm e¤ect that remains constant over time and across employees. The contribution
of this paper is to explore longitudinal aspects of the employer-employee relation-
ship: that is, we estimate the e¤ects of time-varying …rm-level variables on employee
wages, while controlling for …xed unobservable employer and employee heterogene-
ity. Speci…cally, we ask whether a “regular” employee in a …rm should expect her
wages to increase as a result of an increase in her …rm’s stock-market and accounting
pro…tability.
While, for most categories of workers, longitudinal matched employer-employee
data sets are a recent innovation, CEOs and other high-level executives provide no-
table exceptions. The primary focus of the executive compensation literature, as
surveyed by Murphy (1999), has been to estimate the e¤ect …rm performance on ex-
ecutive wealth, while controlling for unobservable individual and …rm heterogeneity
in a manner similar or identical to the methodology we use in this paper. A rea-
sonable summary of our paper is that we estimate “CEO-style” wage equations on
two samples of regular employees. We also develop a theoretical model that pre-
dicts that pay-for-performance links of top management should spread throughout
the entire …rm, and show, for one of the two data sets, results that parallel the CEO
compensation literature quite closely.
The paper closest to ours is Hildreth and Oswald (1997) who showed that average
wages in a panel of UK …rms were increasing in…rm pro…tability, even after controlling
for …xed …rm e¤ects. The next closest paper is Blanch‡ower and Oswald (1996) who
showed that average wages in US manufacturing industries are positively correlated
with industry pro…tability, even after controlling for …xed industry e¤ects and the
average personal characteristics of the industry workforce. Our paper improves on
these papers in two important ways. First, in contrast to the two papers mentioned
above, we can control for unobserved worker heterogeneity as well as unobserved
…rm heterogeneity. Second, we use both market and accounting measures of pro…ts,
which allows us to compare our results to pay-for-performance results in the executive
compensation literature.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our
two data sets and our empirical methodology. Section 3 provides a model in which
the owners of a …rm link the CEO’s wage to …rm performance, which generates
…rm-wide pay-for-performance policies that arise from the CEO’s desire to share
compensation risk with her employees. Section 3 also provides evidence, from one of
the two data sets, that the wages of regular employees are linked to both stock-market
2and accounting pro…ts, providing support for the theoretical model. Section 4 reviews
the methodology employed by Sloan (1993) to explain cross-sectional di¤erences in
the strengths of the links between market and accounting pro…tability. Section 4
then provides evidence, again for one of our data sets, that closely parallels Sloan’s
estimates for CEOs, which provides even stronger support for our model. Section 5
presents evidence on the importance of controlling for both unobserved person and
…rm-speci…c heterogeneity, and section 6 contains our conclusions.
2 Data Description and Methodology
2.1 Data Sets
This paper uses two data sets. The …rst is a match of NLSY respondents to Compu-
stat, a …rm-level database of publicly traded …rms and stock-market data from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The second is a match of State of
Washington unemployment insurance data to employer data, also taken from Com-
pustat and CRSP.
Individuals in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY 79) from 1986-
1994 were matched by hand to information on the employing …rm, using the informa-
tion in con…dential NLSY …les (see Abowd and Finer 1998). Where possible, these
workers were matched to their employing …rms, speci…cally, to the …rm that is the
ultimate bene…cial owner of the employer described in the employer supplement for
each job. When these …rms appear in Compustat and CRSP, a wealth of …rm-level
data is available. Appendix A gives the exact de…nitions for all …rm-level variables
used in this paper.
The other data set used in this paper comes from administrative unemployment
insurance records from the State of Washington. This data set contains earnings
reports for a 10% random sample of the Washington State workforce from 1984-1993.
Personal characteristics are observed for all individuals who were unemployed at any
time during this period. For those who were not unemployed during the sample
frame, personal characteristics are imputed using the Current Population Survey.1
These data are also matched to Compustat and CRSP when possible, again yielding
a host of …rm-level variables. The match was done on the basis of the employer tax
identi…cation number.
Tables 1 and 2 contain descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in this
paper. We divide both data sets into manufacturing and non-manufacturing samples
for two reasons. First, manufacturing workers are often the focus of economic analy-
ses, with Blanch‡ower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1994) the most relevant example for this
paper. Second, we will present evidence later in the paper that the …rm-wide pay-for-
performance relationships of the manufacturing sector di¤er substantially from those
in the non-manufacturing sector.
1See Abowd, Finer, and Kramarz (1998) for a description of the data imputation process.
3Two di¤erences across our data sets are worth mentioning. First, the NLSY is
a young sample, with a mean level of experience of 8.79 years for men and 7.95 for
women. The corresponding …gures from the Washington State sample are 23.73 and
20.55. We will present evidence from the Washington State data that focussing on
young workers might not a¤ect our results much. The other important di¤erence
is that the Washington State sample has an extremely high percentage of manufac-
turing workers. While 31% of men and 21% of women in the NLSY work in the
manufacturing sector, the corresponding …gures from Washington State are 83% and
62%.
2.2 Principal Methodology
The empirical estimates contained in this paper all focus on the e¤ect of …rm variables
on the log wages of individuals. The dependent variable is always the log of the real
hourly wage. While many control variables are included, the estimates of …rm-level
variables yield the coe¢cients of interest. Instead of using contemporaneous values
for the …rm variables, we include values from the previous …scal year. Accounting
earnings, a crucial variable for our analysis, have wage payments imbedded in them, so
lagging this variable might pull the dependent variable out of the right-hand side of the
estimating equations. It is not clear whether this problem should also a¤ect market
measures like stock return, but lagging market returns seems like a safer procedure.2
It is also not clear how quickly wages should adjust in response to changes in …rm
variables. Firms might not have the ability to change wages as soon as the …rm’s
…nancial position changes, making lags of …rm variables more appropriate.
Four types of regression models are presented in each of the regression tables in
this paper. These types are
i. Models accounting for neither unobserved worker nor unobserved …rm hetero-
geneity (simple least squares).
ii. Models accounting for unobserved worker heterogeneity (within person).
iii. Models accounting for unobserved …rm heterogeneity (within …rm).
iv. Models accounting for both unobserved worker and unobserved …rm heterogene-
ity (…rm within person).
The simple least squares results ignore the possibility of …rm and individual het-
erogeneity in the wage determination process, especially heterogeneity that is unob-
servable to the econometrician. The within person models estimate person e¤ects
that control for unobserved heterogeneity, but this method ignores di¤erences in …rm
wage setting policies that are not captured by the measured …rm variables. The
2Abowd (1990) …nds that union wage bargains to e¤ect the market value of …rms.
4within …rm models are the analogs of within person models, except unobserved …rm
heterogeneity is modeled and unobserved worker heterogeneity is ignored.
Finally, the …rm within person models control for both unobserved person and
…rm heterogeneity. In fact, separate e¤ects are estimated for each worker-…rm match.
This methodology has been referred to as the consistent method in Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis (1999) and Finer (1997) and others. When discussing the relationship
between the data and our theoretical model, we will focus only on the …rm within
person results, since these provide the most clear tests of our model. The coe¢cients
on …rm characteristics are identi…ed entirely from time-series variation when the …rm
within person method is used, so the results cannot be driven by correlations between
unobserved heterogeneity and observed …rm characteristics. The model in this paper
ignores worker and …rm heterogeneity, so these components should not be allowed
to in‡uence the estimates of the coe¢cients of interest. Section 5 contains brief
discussions on the di¤erences between the …rm within person estimates and the other
estimates, including implications for earlier work in the literature.
2.3 Employee Pay-For-Performance Due to Managerial Risk Aversion
The model is based on the idea that managers a¤ect …rm performance by performing
more than one task. In this model, …rm performance is a function of the revenue
generating activity of the CEO, as well as the wage decisions of the CEO pertaining
to other employees. Assuming it is di¢cult to contract on each component of …rm
performance, the CEO may choose to link the wage outcomes for other employees to
the …rm’s revenue realizations in order to smooth CEO compensation.
The literature already contains several models in which managers might take
costly actions to smooth …rm performance. Other models in which risk-averse man-
agers take (possibly costly) actions to smooth compensation include Lambert (1984),
Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), and Dye (1988). The model that is most similar
to ours is contained in Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), who derive income smoothing
from a manager who wishes to prevent dismissal to preserve the rent she receives
from the position. If performance realizations in the distant past are less informative
than those of the recent past for predicting future performance, the manager will take
actions that shift income to the future during good times, and shift income to the
present in bad times, despite the fact that this smoothing is costly to the …rm.3
While similar in spirit to many of the models mentioned above, the model pre-
sented in this section is tailored to derive empirical predictions on …rm-wide wage
policies. In particular, since our model is so similar to the models tested in the
executive compensation literature, we will be able to use similar empirical method-
ologies. We accomplish this by explicitly modeling the actions a manager might take
3Empirical evidence for smoothing can be found in Defond and Park (1997) who …nd that managers
are less likely to make income decreasing discretionary accruals during times of poor performance
and good expected future performance.
5to smooth …rm performance and explicitly modeling the costs of such actions.
Before turning to our model, we should discuss an alternative that might yield
similar empirical predictions. Since our empirical work uses large publicly traded
…rms, we assume away the possibility that linking the wages of all workers to …rm-wide
performance measures can have signi…cant incentive e¤ects. Despite the theoretical
appeal of this assumption, a growing literature points to a productivity e¤ects of
group incentives.4 The empirical predictions of our model might be identical to those
of a group incentives model, provided that the optimal contracts for top executives
and the rest of the workforce have similar features. We do not, however, know of any
empirically viable theoretical models that solve the “ 1
N” problem.
Our model has three players: a principal, a manager, and an employee. The
principal hires the manager to do two things:
1. Take some action am:
2. Set We, the wage level for the employee The employee is necessary for the
project, but can be monitored perfectly at zero cost.
The project generates
y = am + "
in …rm value, where " » N(0;¾2):










, and the employee’s utility function is ¡exp[¡reWe].
Assume further that the principal can only contract on (y ¡ We), and o¤ers the
manager a contract of the form
Wm = Sm + bm (y ¡We), (1)
subject to incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality constraints that will be
dealt with later. The manager then chooses a wage contract of the form
We = Se +bey, (2)
subject to an individual rationality constraint. To be more precise, the timing of the
game is as follows:
1. The principal o¤ers the manager a wage contract of the form speci…ed in equa-
tion 1.
2. The manager o¤ers the wage contract speci…ed in equation 2.
4See, for example, Kruse (1993) and Jones and Kato (1995).
63. The manager chooses am.
4. y is realized and compensation occurs.
Note that we abstract away from any incentive problems that might exist below
the managerial level. This is not because we believe that incentive problems only exist
at the CEO level, but rather because we want to model a scenario in which middle to
lower level employees of large …rms have their pay tied to the overall performance of
the …rm, despite the fact that they only have a trivial impact on overall performance.
We certainly believe that lower level employees of large …rms have incentive contracts
based on measures that are more narrowly de…ned than overall …rm performance, but
we want to model why their pay could depend on overall …rm performance which is
entirely out of their control.
One might also be concerned with the application of this model to situations
in which a pro…t sharing scheme is publicly observable. The principal would be
better o¤ contracting on y and We separately, instead of (y ¡We) as a unit, so this
model predicts that shareholders would not allow their managers to openly implement
easily observable pro…t sharing schemes. The model is therefore more applicable to
implicit schemes that are not easily observable from outside the …rm. It is worth
noting, however, that the value of …rm stock could be a¤ected by the wages paid
by the …rm, and accounting measures such as earnings would certainly be a¤ected.
Since managerial stock ownership and bonuses tied to accounting measures are both
important incentive aligning tools in large …rms, we believe the assumed form of the
managerial contract is reasonable.
2.3.1 Stage 3
The manager’s problem can be expressed as
max
am
bm [am ¡ beam];
implying that
am = bm (1 ¡ be): (3)
2.3.2 Stage 2
Substituting for am as in equation 3, the employee’s utility constraint can be expressed
as follows:





7where Ue is the certainty equivalent wage level needed to compensate the employee



















bm + re¾2 + rmbm¾2: (5)
2.3.3 Stage 1
Denoting Um as the analog of Ue, and using the results from earlier subsections, the
principal’s objective function can be written as
bm [1¡ be (bm)]¡ 1
2 [bm [1¡ be (bm)]]
2¡
rm¾2






where be (bm) is de…ned as in equation 5. To gain intuition for the above expression,
the …rst two terms are simply am¡
a2
m
2 as seen from equation 3: In the …rst-best, total
surplus would be maximized by maximizing am ¡
a2
m
2 , i:e:; setting am = 1: The third
term represents the cost due to the manager facing compensation risk5, while the
fourth term represents the cost due to the employee facing compensation risk. Note
that as rm approaches zero (the manager becomes risk-neutral), …rst-best solution
arises (the last two terms in expression 6 disappear). Also note that as re approaches
zero (the employee becomes risk neutral), the principal can set bm = 1; which results
in managerial incentives (bm (1 ¡ be)) of 1
1+rm¾2; which is the standard result from
the single principal/single agent model.
While the derivative of expression 6 is quite messy, it is not hard to …nd the
value of this derivative at bm = 0: In fact, it is simply the derivative of bm(1 ¡be) =
b2
m+bmre¾2
bm+re¾2+rmbm¾2, which equals 1 at bm = 1. This is enough information to say that
bm > 0 and be > 0, implying that the employee receives a pay-for-performance con-
tract in absence of a moral hazard or adverse selection problem.
An attractive feature of this model is that it can be generalized to one in which
multiple signals of am are incorporated quite easily. This generalization provides us
with the speci…c testable implications examined in section 4. Suppose, for instance,
that
ret = am ¡We +" and (7)
earn = am ¡We +²; (8)
5As familiar from agency models such as Holmstrom (1987).
8where ret is the stock market return for …rm j in year t, earn is the accounting
earnings (not including wage payments) for …rm j in year t. A linear wage contract
based on both performance measures can, without loss of generality, be expressed as
Wm = Sm + bm [¸ret +(1 ¡¸)earn];
where ¸ is chosen to minimize
¸2¾2
" + (1 ¡ ¸)
2¾2
² +2¸(1 ¡ ¸)cov(";²);
which is simply the variance of the weighted average of the two performance measures.
Holding bm constant, the use of any ¸ other than the one implicitly de…ned above
results in lower managerial incentives, higher compensation risk for the manager, and
higher compensation risk for the employee. Under this setup, ¸
1¡¸ is the ratio of
the manager’s share (piece rate) of stock return to manager’s share (piece rate) of
accounting earnings. Note, however, that once ¸ is …xed, the model collapses down
to the model with a single signal of am presented above. We therefore know that
¸
1¡¸ is also the ratio of the employee’s share (piece rate) of stock return to employee’s
















which is equation A.4 from Sloan (1993). While Sloan’s model, which was based on a
model by Banker and Data (1989), did not allow the manager to smooth her consump-
tion by changing other employees’ wages, this addition does not change the empirical
predictions relating to the manager’s wage, as the above analysis demonstrates. The
empirical implications relating to the manager’s wage are simply extended through-
out the rest of the …rm, which enables us to implement our test. Assuming ¾2
² > ¾2
"
(accounting earnings are noisier measures than market returns and ¾2
" > cov(";²)
(which guarantees that earnings will positively a¤ect wages), Sloan shows that
¸¤







1 ¡ ¸¤ is increasing in ½(";²): (10)
6The manager chooses to set the ratio of the employee’s piece rates for market and accounting
pro…ts to
¸
1¡¸, even if the manager can choose other ratios.
9Intuition for the above results is quite simple. Condition 9 says that market
returns will have a higher weight in both the manager’s wage contract and the em-
ployee’s wage contract when the market returns are relatively better (less noisy)
signals. Condition 10 relies on the assumption that accounting returns are noisier
measures than marker returns. Despite this noise, accounting returns can be valuable
as an incentive tool if the error terms are negatively correlated, since this negative
correlation can help shield the executive and employee from compensation risk.
The above analysis demonstrates the empirical usefulness of our model. Not only
does the model predict that …rm-wide pay-for-performance should exist, even in large
…rms, but it also generates predictions on the nature of this relationship. Since this
relationship has already been tested in the executive compensation literature, only
minor adaptations of an established empirical methodology are required to test our
model.
As a …rst step towards testing our model, we test whether accounting and market
pro…tability a¤ect the wages of regular employees at all. Our measure of market prof-
itability is the rate of return to the …rm’s common stock over the previous …scal year.
This is a standard measure in the executive compensation literature. Our measure of
accounting pro…tability is the …rm’s earnings per employee in the previous …scal year.
While accounting earnings are typically normalized by assets in the executive com-
pensation literature, normalizing by employees seems more appropriate for estimating
…rm-wide pay-for-performance. We also control for the Log of total employment in
the previous …scal year to distinguish our model’s empirical predictions from a model
in which pro…table …rms choose to increase employment, leading to wage increases
due to monopsony power.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results from empirical models, for manufacturing and
non-manufacturing workers respectively, in which the log of the real hourly wage is
regressed on the …rm variables mentioned above, and a wealth of personal control
variables. While simple least squares, within person, within …rm, and …rm within
person estimates are shown, we will focus on …rm within person estimates since they
control for the most unobservable heterogeneity. Note that, for both manufacturing
and non-manufacturing workers, none of the …rm-level variables have a statistically
signi…cant e¤ect on log wages. The NLSY therefore provides no evidence that …rm-
wide pay-for-performance exists.
The Washington State data, however, present a substantially di¤erent story. Ta-
bles 5 and 6 present estimates from the Washington State data, again for manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing workers respectively. Turning …rst to the …rm within
person results in table 5, we see that both stock-market return and accounting earn-
ings per worker have positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ects on log wages in the
manufacturing sector, as our model predicts. While, in this paper, we will not o¤er
an interpretation for log employment other than as a control variable, we do note
that …rm growth is also associated with wage increases, even after controlling for un-
observed person and …rm heterogeneity. Turning to the results on non-manufacturing
10workers in table 6, we see that accounting earnings is the only …rm-level variable that
appears to a¤ect log wages.7 We conclude from tables 5 and 6 that the Washington
State data o¤er preliminary support for our model, leading us to undertake the more
speci…c tests in section 4.
Before turning to these more speci…c tests of our model, we try to explain the
di¤erences of estimates across data sets. The most obvious di¤erence between the
two data sets is that the NLSY is a young sample. In particular, the oldest person
in the NLSY is 36 in 1994, 35 in 1993, ..., and 28 in 1986. We therefore examine
young workers in the Washington State sample by eliminating workers older than 36
in 1993, older than 35 in 1992, ..., older than 28 in 1985, and all workers from 1984
to obtain the best possible analogy to the NLSY. Tables 7 and 8 present estimates
of the pay-for-performance relationships on young workers in the Washington State
data for manufacturing and non-manufacturing workers respectively. Tables 7 and
8 both show that the link between accounting earnings and log wages is actually
stronger for young workers. While the coe¢cient on stock return in table 7 is a bit
smaller than in table 5, it is still quite strong. We therefore do not view the age
structure of the NLSY as a likely candidate for the di¤erences in estimates across
data sets. This leaves us with at least two possibilities, which we cannot test. The
…rst is simply the smaller sample size of the NLSY. Second, since the Washington
State wage data come from administrative records rather than surveys, the wage
data might be less subject to measurement error. We now proceed to investigating
cross-sectional di¤erences in pay-for-performance slopes using techniques from the
executive compensation literature.
2.4 Cross-Sectional Di¤erences in Pay-For-Performance Slopes
An important issue faced by the executive compensation literature was to explain why
accounting measures of pro…tability seemed to impact executive wages, despite the
fact that the owners of the …rm should only care about market returns. Sloan (1993)
argues that while stock market returns are a¤ected to a large extent by market-
wide movements that are outside of any individual executive’s control, accounting
earnings are mainly driven by …rm-speci…c factors. The use of accounting earnings in
executive contracts can therefore be viewed as a substitute for relative compensation
policies studied by Antle and Smith (1986) Gibbons and Murphy (1990). Sloan uses
his conjecture to explain cross-sectional di¤erences in pay-for-performance slopes in
CEO contracts. More speci…cally, he assumes a structure for market and accounting
returns that allows him to test the empirical implications given in 9 and 10. We
present a slightly modi…ed version of his methodology below.
7In addition to the monopsony story mentioned earlier, a story in which pro…table …rms choose to
impose overtime on their workforce might also explain these results. Including Log hours, however,
does not change the results.
11Consider a standard market model of the form
retjt = ¯0j +¯1j (vwretd)t +Sjt; (11a)
where retjt is the stock-market return (including dividends) for …rm j in …scal year t,
vwretdt is the CRSP value-weighted index for …scal year t. Since ¯1j typically is not
zero, stock market returns are a¤ected by market-wide factors. Sloan therefore views
Sjt as the “true” signal of executive performance and ¯1j (vwretd)t as the residual,
i.e., the component of stock return that is outside of the executive’s control. Under
these assumptions, ¯1j (vwretd)t is " from equation 7.
In order to model the proposition that accounting earnings provide a signal of
executive actions that is not a¤ected by market-wide factors, we estimate
earnpjt = Á0j +Á1jSjt +Ejt; (12)
where earnpjt is the earnings excluding extraordinary items per employee and Ejt is
a residual, i.e., outside the executive’s control.8 Ejt corresponds to ² from equation
8.
We estimate equations 11a and 12 for all …scal years from 1975-1994 for which
the relevant data are available. We exclude …rms for which fewer than 10 years of
data are available for estimation of the earnings model. Sloan shows that the ratio





















while the correlation of error terms needed to test the proposition given by 10 can be
estimated using
rhoj ´ corr(Ej;vwretd):
Sloan found strong support for both propositions. In particular, he found that the
coe¢cient on stock returns was decreasing ratvarj, and increasing in rhoj: Conversely,
the coe¢cient on accounting pro…ts was increasing in ratvarj and decreasing in rhoj.
All four of these results are consistent with his model. Since the model we presented
in section two has the same empirical implications, a similar empirical test will su¢ce.
We now turn to the tables that test these propositions.
8This is the most signi…cant departure from Sloan’s methodology. Sloan uses both the change in
earnings per share divided by price and the change in earnings divided by assets as his accounting
measures. He does this because his compensation equations use the change in Log compensation as
the dependent variable, the change in the accounting variable as the accounting measure, and the
level of stock return as the market measure. We believe using changes in all variables, or alternatively
using …xed e¤ects, is more consistent with agency theory.
12Tables 9 and 10 show, for manufacturing and non-manufacturing workers respec-
tively, estimates in which both performance variables are in interacted with ratvarj
and rhoj for the NLSY data set. This allows the pay-for-performance slopes to vary as
hypothesized. Since tables 3 and 4 provided no evidence of any pay-for-performance
links, it should not be surprising to see that the interactions do not have much ex-
planatory power. None of our estimates from the NLSY are precise enough to reject
or validate the predictions of our model.
Tables 11 and 12, which are the analogs of tables 9 and 10 for the Washington
State sample, provide evidence that is much more informative. We …rst examine
table 11, which focuses on manufacturing workers. Note that the link between log
wages and stock market return is decreasing in ratvarj, while the link between log
wages and earnings per worker is increasing in ratvarj. Both of these relationships
are predicted by our model and similar to those observed by Sloan for CEOs. We
view these results as strongly supportive of our model. Now note that the strengths
of the link between accounting returns is decreasing in rhoj as predicted, while the
link between market returns is also decreasing in rhoj, contrary to our predictions
and contrary to Sloan’s …ndings.9 Despite the coe¢cient on the interaction between
market return and rhoj, we view the manufacturing results from the Washington
State data as supportive of our model.
Table 12, which focuses on non-manufacturing workers in the Washington State
data, yields insigni…cant coe¢cients on the interactions of interest. Recall that table
6 did provide some measure of support for our model by uncovering a positive link
between log wages and accounting earnings. The fact that none of the interactions
of interest are statistically signi…cant, however, prevents us from claiming anything
beyond weak support from non-manufacturing workers in Washington State.
3 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Earlier Work
As mentioned earlier, while Blanch‡ower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996) and Hildreth
and Oswald (1997) could not control for unobservable worker heterogeneity, we con-
trol for both unobservable worker and unobservable …rm heterogeneity. We now
brie‡y examine the importance of this contribution. The most natural way for us to
compare our results to those mentioned above is to compare our within …rm results
(which ignore unobservable worker heterogeneity) to our …rm within person results.
We focus on accounting pro…tability since this represents the closest analog to the
pro…tability measures in earlier work. Note that in table 5, which uses manufacturing
workers in Washington State, the coe¢cient on earnings per worker in the …rm within
person results is more than double the coe¢cient from the within …rm results. The
coe¢cients on earnings per worker in table 6, which used non-manufacturing workers
in Washington State is roughly the same in the within …rm and …rm within person
9The prediction is technically about the ratio of the pay-for-performance slopes, which we cannot
test.
13estimates. We therefore conjecture that the pay-for-performance estimates from prior
work that could not control for unobservable worker heterogeneity are more likely to
be underestimates of the true e¤ects than overestimates, indicating that the results
from these paper are probably qualitatively correct.
Table 5 provides another interesting result relating to the sorting of workers within
a …rm over time. Note that the coe¢cient on log employment is substantially larger
in the …rm within person model than in the within …rm model. This tells us that,
when manufacturing …rms expand, they tend to hire workers who consistently earn
wages that are lower than expected given their observable characteristics. This is
clear evidence that the unobservable components of the workforces of …rms change
over time, and hints at an area for future research. This sorting could, for example,
have important implications for estimates of the return to seniority that do not control
for unobservable worker heterogeneity.
3.1 Conclusion
Evidence on the link between …rm performance and the wages of “regular” employees
is di¢cult to …nd. Using two longitudinal matched employer-employee data sets in
which individuals are matched to their employing …rms, we provide estimates of this
link.
Speci…cally, we estimate wage equations for individual regular employees of large
…rms that control for unobservable heterogeneity of both the workers and …rms in
order to estimate …rm-wide pay-for-performance links. We show evidence that stock
returns and accounting earnings positively a¤ect wages throughout large …rms. We
also develop a theoretical model that predicts the wages of all employees in a …rm
should be linked to the wages of top management, which provides speci…c testable
predictions that are similar to those tested in the executive compensation literature.
We …nd mixed support for our model.
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